Edward A. David

03 November 2023. An essay for the first Novitate Conference.

Laws, if reasonable, are meant to foster the common good of a society. They do not favor one set of interests over another. And they do not narrow our moral vision; indeed, they broaden that vision by pointing to good, reasonable ends—free speech and assembly, or the use of private property, for instance. Law thus elicits desires—desires that pertain not only to our very selves and our own good, but also to our communities, the societies in which we belong, and with which seek to remain in communion.

Desires, of course, come in many forms. René Girard famously speaks of mimetic desires which, in the context of humanity’s selfish tendencies, manifest themselves through less than desirable behaviors. Violence in society, competition within families—these are but some of the consequences of Girardian mimesis. Here, law responds in a negative way to the inherent fallenness of human nature: it coerces to maintain a semblance of peace; it frustrates the violent hand to preserve the body politic. 

But, if “optimists” from Aristotle to Jesus, from Confucius to Ghandi, are right, then desires are not merely of the violent sort. They can indeed be reasonable—indicative of, and inclining towards, true good in the world. Attending to such desires, law can motivate through good. It can create space, as well, for individuals to imitate the moral best in each other, to emulate exemplary others in non-rivalrous, mutually-rewarding, even selfless ways. 

In this essay, I offer three brief reflections on the interplay between law, desire, and rivalry, doing so with mimesis—in both its positive and negative forms—in mind. These reflections—which acknowledge the mixed valence of human existence, particularly as seen in the prism of highly regulated industries—set the conceptual groundwork for our panel.

NB. The essay will not necessarily be part of the Novitate Conference proceedings, contrary to the ORA listing’s note.